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BOOK REVIEWS
PUBLIC LAW PERSPECTIVES ON A PRIVATE LAW PROBLEM: AUTO COMPENSATION PLANS.

By Walter J. Blum and Harry Kalven, Jr.'

Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1965, Pp. vii, 88. $2.50.
The sponsors of various suggested plans for compensating the victims of
automobile accidents have been inclined to predicate their proposals on the
premise that the automobile accident is a social hazard, an inevitable result and
a by-product of motor-minded American progress.2 Such sponsors apparently
see nothing unrealistic in the idea of special generosity to this particular class
while ignoring those who suffer misfortunes from other causes.
These views are challenged by the authors of this well-organized little
book. They note that "the problem is bigger than that which the proponents
started out to solve," and they make the point that "the welfare universe is not
limited to victims of auto accidents but includes victims of all other kinds of
human misfortune. We can think of no ground for singling out the misfortune
of auto accident victims for special welfare treatment." 8
An interesting feature of this book is that it explores what might be called
the "social security approach" to the problem of compensating the automobile
accident victim. Overly simplified, this approach would contemplate (a) elimination of the "fault criterion," and (b) a "wide scheme of accident insurance"
that "would require use of the taxing mechanism to collect premiums, producing
what can be viewed as an extension of social security." 4
The title of this book is derived from the circumstance that a teacher of
private law and a teacher of public law combine their perspectives "on a topic
that seems to need the attention and skills of both."' Because they relate the
problem of automobile accident compensation to social security and the welfare
approach to relief of misfortune, these writers recognize that "private law cannot borrow goals from public law fields without accepting the obligation to
make a proper public law analysis." 6
This is not to say that Professors Blum and Kalven endorse social security
as a solution to the problem of compensating the automobile accident victim.
On the contrary, they assert that "the social security approach to the problem
of the auto accident victim has some destructive disadvantages."' In this respect, they point out that this approach:
(1) Would seem to run the greatest risk of lessening deterrence, if "economic considerations have a bearing on accident causing behavior";

(2) Has "the disadvantage of supplanting the private insurance industry
1 Professors of Law, University of Chicago Law School.
2 Marx, Compensation Insurance for Automobile Accident Victims: The Case For Compulsory Automobile Compensation Insurance, 15 OHio ST. L. J. 134, 137 (1954).
3 Text at 83.
4 Ibid.
5 Text at 8.
6 Text at 85.
7 Ibid.
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in a major sector of its activities, and replacing it with taxation and government administration of welfare benefits";
(3) Would "add to the power of the government and weaken what now
is an important private pool of power"; and
(4) Calls for "one more - and perhaps an irreversible - reduction in the
area of individual autonomy."'
Various persons have advocated different proposals looking toward substantial changes in our legal system's treatment of automobile accident claims. Among
those that have been advanced and which are mentioned in this book are:
(1) The Columbia auto plan of 1932;' (2) Green's "loss insurance"; 0 (3)
Ehrenzweig's "full aid" plan; (4) The Clarence Morris proposal; (5) The
Conard report; 3 (6) The Marx reforms;' 4 (7) The California study; 5 and
(8) The Keeton-O'Connell plan.' Blum and Kalven assert that the main
question involved in the consideration of any such plan is whether there may
be "a single choice" between (1) the common-law adversary system "in which
not all victims recover, and where inevitably there is delay in paying claims,"
and (2) an auto compensation plan under which "every victim would get
something, including prompt payment of medical and emergency expenses."' 7
This is a result of the premise that "the heedless, callous person causing injury
would be paid on the identical formula as the innocent victim."' 8 As Blum
and Kalven state, "This is too stark a contrast because of possible variations
both on the common law side and among auto compensation plans."' 9
Perhaps no other book on the contemporary scene has so clearly spelled
out the elements of the problem that Blum and Kalven discuss. What they see
in the suggested auto compensation plans may perhaps be outlined as follows:
Alternative I. Placing the cost of additional coverage on motorists. This would
involve:
A. Redistributing losses among victims by placing the additional cost on
some victims; or
B. Placing the cost on society as a whole rather than on some identifiable
group; or
C. Financing the additional coverage out of the economies
of administration
'20
expected to be derived from moving to a "plan.

8 Ibid.
9 1932 REPORT

OF COMMrsITTEE TO STUDY COMPENSATION FOR AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS

(Columbia reports).
10 GREEN, TRAFFIC VICTIMS: TORT LAW AND INSURANCE (1958).
11 EHRENZWEIG, "FULL AID" INSURANCE (1954); Ehrenzweig, Towards an Automobile
Compensation Plan, 3 FEDERATION OF INS. COUNSEL Q., 5 (1961).
12 Morris, Hazardous Enterprisesand Risk Bearing Capacity, 61 YALE L.J. 1172 (1952).
13

CoNA D & MORGAN, THE ECONOMICS OF INJURY LITIGATION (1960).

14 Marx, supra note 2.
15 Weigel, Preliminary Report of Plans for Inquiry into the Wisdom of a California
Automobile Accident Commission, 34 CAL. ST. BJ. 393 (1959).
16 KEETON & O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM (1966).
17 Text at 4.
18 Knepper, The Automobile in Court, 17 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 213, 222 (1960).
,19 Text at 4.
20 Text at 31.
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Alternative II. Requiring potential victims to insure themselves against injury
regardless of third party fault. Objections to this would include that:
A. No one should be compelled to pay premiums to insure against losses
caused by the fault of another.
B. Everyone may buy auto accident insurance, but why should the state
intervene and compel him to do so?
C. The administrative cost of selling separate insurance policies covering
auto accidents to the entire population would be prohibitive."
Blum and Kalven also note that three other points are usually urged by
sponsors of such plans, namely that:
(1) The bluntest version of the discussion of vicarious liability doctrines
is that a loss should be placed on the party with the "deepest pocket" ;22
(2) Because motorists, the argument runs, are a class wealthier than
victims as a class, the motorists should pay for accident losses;23 and
(3) The settlement ratio is already extremely high- approaching ninetyseven percent for all claims24 - so that we already have a liability-withoutfault program in effect.
Thus, in facing up to the various aspects of the plans and proposals which
emanate from countless sources - from ivory towers to legislative halls - Blum
and Kalven do a realistic job of spelling out what must be considered in trying
to decide whether a new and different auto-victim-compensating program can
be developed in today's society.
Furthermore, they repudiate the idea that we should "Sue for Safety,"
observing that "the law has not taken very seriously the possibility of deterring
with tort sanction."25 They recognize that "the driver's own personal safety is
almost certain to be involved in any accident and that financial liability on the
driver is not likely to add materially to this natural sanction."'2 6
These writers do not "rush to applaud" the idea of "killing off lawyers." 27
Noting that even in the case of a compensation plan, a claimant will be financially better off with legal representation, they point out that:
Everything in our experience strongly indicates that the lawyer frequently is an economically valuable component of the negotiating process
in the simple sense that the results are different when he participates. For
a compensation plan to work as intended, the adversary balance contributed by the lawyer will often be needed.28
It is submitted that as today's society views the problem of compensating
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

Text at
Text at
Ibid.
Text at
Text at
Text at
Text at
Ibid.

40-41.
55.
47.
62.
63.
48.
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the victims of automobile accidents, it should differentiate between (1) the
responsibility of that society to alleviate the distresses of its members, and (2)
the duty of an individual to compensate his neighbor for damages suffered by
accident. The first is the corporate responsibility of the state, based on the
socio-economic concept of our American way of life. The second is derived
from the fundamental religious belief that each of us is responsible to his God
for his own conduct- hence, in respect to his neighbor, he is responsible only
for that which results from his fault. This analysis and this resulting concept
of liability-for-fault are fundamental to the common law that serves as the basis
of our jurisprudence. Blum and Kalven recognize these principles, as they
state that the "whole concept of fault" is closely tied to views on personal responsibility - "and hence to values that have deep cultural and religious roots." 9
This book encompasses much information in few pages. Whether one
agrees with the views of these writers is unimportant. What is significant is that
whoever studies this text will have a better and clearer understanding of one
of the most serious problems in today's economy.
William E. Knepper*
Box. By Howard Felsher' and Michael Rosen.' New
York: The Macmillan Company, 1966. Pp. 239. $5.95.
This informative publication spotlights the titanic collision between the
first amendment right of freedom of the press and the sixth amendment right
of fair trial. A parade of sensationalistic cases documents the authors' position the all-powerful press must be curbed by legislative sanction from preventing the
"newsworthy" accused from receiving his constitutional right to a fair trial.
The prologue succinctly states the case against the press:
THE PRESS

IN THE JURY

Nowhere are newspapers so thorough as they are in reporting crimes.
The bloodier the crime, the more specific the report. . . . A narcotics
murder is worth a half-dozen hit-and-run deaths to an editor with a sense
of reader interest. Rape is a headline; rape plus perversion plus throatcutting is the approach of the millennium.
When a suspect in a sensational case is finally picked up and booked,
editors may well lay in an extra supply of ink. Every detail of the crime
is re-created, every scar on the suspect's face is lengthened and colored;
the arresting officers are besieged for quotes (and usually give them), investigating officers are asked what evidence they have (and usually give it),
school records are examined, employers questioned, and families badgered.
The crudest behavior is piously justified by editorial affirmations of the
public's right to know.
In crime reporting, the press prints every fact it can find, and some
facts it imagines. We read the stories and prejudge the defendant before
he has been near the courtroom.
29 Text at 8.
*

Member, Ohio Bar.

1 Howard Felsher, a television writer-producer especially active in public affairs programs
and documentaries, wrote the book.
2 Michael Rosen, an attorney, is responsible for the research.
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At some point during the time we were borrowing our judicial system
from the English, we closed our eyes and missed the guarantee of the rights
of the accused with regard to the press. The English long ago recognized
that the press, if it would have a conscience at all, would have it only if
imposed by law.3
4
This book is written for the general audience rather than for the attorney.
If the authors' purpose is only to "provoke constructive comment" by giving
the public an awareness that modem press coverage has a "negative bearing on
our judicial system,"' then they have achieved their purpose well. If, however,
it is the authors' objective to recruit advocates for their thesis, The Press in the
Jury Box lacks the requisite impact to apostolize, for it fails to establish the
rapport necessary to evoke from its reader lasting emotional feeling.
Be forewarned that the authors have no pretensions of effecting an analytic,
dispassionate study. This is an angry assault on the press. The approach is
reportorial rather than legalistic. For one familiar with the topic, it is at best
light reading giving little or no insight into the jurisprudential considerations
that any balancing of such basic constitutional rights necessitates. It is likewise
of no value for research since it is devoid of citation, although the book is in
essence a collation of cases where the rights of the accused have been trammelled.
This expos6 - Felsher is a script writer, not a novelist - moves quickly.
It is, however, virtually impossible to make dull reading of such sordid fare as
the Lindbergh kidnapping, the Rosenberg spy trial, or the Sheppard case. The
first chapter effectively sets the stage by shocking the reader into a realization of
the omnipotence of the communications media. "God should have been a newspaperman. Then He would really be the focus of worship. . . All the world
prays to the power of the press. This power is based on fear and the demonstrated ability of the press to mold the minds of men."6 The succeeding chapters
headline horrible examples of newspaper excesses to illustrate how, under the
banner of "the public's right to know," the circulation-impelled press is driven
unrelentingly in the quest for sensationalistic fare for the table of the insatiable
7
public.
Since the Supreme Court has granted certiorari and the Sheppard case is
once again in the public eye, it has been selected as an example to illustrate
the effect of news "coverage" on the judicial process. In the chapter aptly

3

Text at 30-31.

4 Of greater interest to the practicing attorney is the monograph FAIR TrAL vs. A FREE
Pass (Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, 1965). It consists of the papers
offered at a 1965 symposium by Zelman Cowen, Dean of the University of Melbourne Law
School; Alfred Friendly, Managing Editor of the Washington Post; Gene Blake, Los Angeles
Times Staff Writer; Donald H. McGannon, President of Westinghouse Broadcasting Company,
Inc., and W. H. Parker, Chief of Police of Los Angeles. Most sides of the question are
presented in this interesting, succinct and readable thirty-six page paper. It may be procured
without cost from the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, Box 4068, Santa Barbara,
California.
5 Text at 7-8.
6 Text at 15.
7 While the newspapers are the focus of this attack, it is worth mentioning that the
other communications media, especially television, have the potential for even greater infringements. The authors explore this in their chapter, "The Zealousness Transplant: Newspapers to TV."
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titled "The Editor as Judge," the authors review the Sam Sheppard case, labelling it the "perfect example of dereliction of our nation's editors."' The murder
of Marilyn Sheppard had attracted national attention. Dr. Sam related the
story of a bushy-haired intruder who bludgeoned his pregnant wife. Because
of the dearth of evidence indicating the presence of an outside suspect, suspicion
soon centered on Dr. Sheppard himself. After several subtle editorials demanding that the police question Sheppard, three weeks after the murder Cleveland
Press editor Louis Seizer dropped all pretense and "got down to the business
of being his own judge and jury."9 The July 30th headline read, "Why Isn't
Sam Sheppard in Jail?" - the following edition, "Quit Stalling - Bring Him
In." Sheppard was indicted. "To this day no one can know how deeply the
grand jury was influenced by the campaign against Sheppard waged by the
Cleveland Press."'1 But the Press was not satisfied with precipitating an indictment; it would settle only for a conviction. The newspapers previewed the evidence. Hearsay and other inadmissible evidence were brought to the attention
of the public. James S. Bell of the Supreme Court of Ohio paints a vivid picture of the atmosphere then prevailing:
Murder and mystery, society, sex and suspense were combined in
this case in such a manner as to intrigue and captivate the public fancy to
a degree perhaps unparalleled in recent annals. Throughout the preindictment investigation, the subsequent legal skirmishes and the nine-week
trial, circulation-conscious editors catered to the insatiable interest of the
American public in the bizarre. Special seating facilities for reporters and
columnists representing local papers and all major news services were installed in the courtroom. Special rooms in the Criminal Courts building
were equipped for broadcasters and telecasters. In this atmosphere of a
"Roman Holiday" for the news media, Sam Sheppard stood trial for his
life.1:1
Needless to say, Sheppard was convicted; but after ten years in prison he won an
appeal based on the refusal to grant a change of venue. The real question is:
since virtually every newspaper in America had featured the Sheppard case,
was it possible for him to obtain a fair trial anywhere? Perhaps the Supreme
Court will answer that question.
Of special interest is the final chapter which presents available remedies
and attempts an evaluation. The authors conclude that only a legislative enactment which embodies the English system of almost complete restraint from
pre-verdict news coverage of criminal cases will be effectual. The alternatives,
especially that of a more rigid enforcement of Canon 20,' should be of particular interest to all members of the legal profession.
8
9
10
11
12

Text
Text
Text
Text

at 68.
at 73.
at 76.
at 33-34.

CANONS
TWENTY:

OF PROFESSIONAL

ETHICS OF 'Ina AmERICAN

BAR AssocIATION,

CANON

Newspaper publications by a lawyer as to pending or anticipated litigation may

interfere with a fair trial in the Courts and otherwise prejudice the due administration of justice. Generally they are to be condemned. If the extreme circumstances
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The press excuses or at least attempts to justify its behavior on the theory
that most of what it prints comes from police and attorney "leaks." The chapter,
"The Unpluggable Dike: Leaks to the Press," relates the indiscretions of policemen and prosecutors in supplying the much needed quote for a scoop. Even
Chief Justice Warren was guilty of using the intentional press leak in his younger
days to obtain an indictment." In an attempt to dry up the sources of these
leaks, the Supreme Court of New Jersey has banned potentially prejudicial
statements by prosecutors, policemen, and defense lawyers to news media before
and during criminal trials.' 4 The court's pronouncement singled out for censure
statements about "alleged confessions or inculpatory admissions" by the accused,
assertions that the case was "open and shut," and references to prior police
records. Sanctions can be imposed on offending lawyers by the court and on
police offenders by police disciplinary authorities. 5 While such a solution is not
as completely effectual as that of the authors', it has the advantage of not directly interfering with the freedom of the press.
Since there seems to be universal acceptance of the oft-quoted H. L.
Mencken remark that "journalistic codes of ethics are all moonshine," the alternative of a newsman's code 6 -a statement of principles "to educate a lot of
newspaper people.., to get them to take voluntarily the necessary steps to see
that freedom of the press does not interfere with fair trials"'T-cannot be seriously considered. Other possible solutions, including the exercise of the court's
contempt power" and the accused's recourse to a libel suit, are fraught with
problems. 9
Concededly, legislative enactment is the only way of insuring that the
communications media do not "poison the fountain of justice before it begins
to flow." 2 But, do we want to afford less than the full measure of the first
amendment guarantee? While this reviewer is in complete agreement with the
authors that there can be no compromise with the accused's right to a fair trial,
there is a possible alternative which the authors have not considered. Judge
J. Skelly Wright2 ' advocates the dismissing of those cases where pretrial pubof a particular case justify a statement to the public, it is unprofessional to make it
anonymously. An ex parte reference to the facts should not go beyond quotation
from the records and papers on file in the court; but even in extreme cases it is
better to avoid any ex parte statement.
13 Text at 89-92. An excerpt from Earl Warren: A Great American Story by Irving Stone
relates how District Attorney Warren, feeling the necessity for public support, released each
day's proceedings of the grand jury to the press. When condemned for this practice, Warren
quoted the California statute-"members of the Grand Jury may not disclose evidence"-but
argued that the statute did not prohibit the district attorney from doing so.
14 State v. Van Duyne, 43 N.J. 368, 204 A.2d 841, 852 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S.
987 (1965).
15 FAIR TRIAL VS. A FREE PRESS, op. cit. supra note 4, at 2.
16 See, e.g., Massachusetts Guide for Bar and News Media, id. at 34-36.
17 Id. at 26.
18 The Supreme Court decisions in Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962), Craig v.
Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947), Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946), and Bridges v.
California, 314 U.S. 252 '(1941), appear to have insulated the press from judicial contempt.
19 Among other problems, truth is an absolute defense and much of prejudicial pretrial
publicity is concededly true. Also, the cost of such litigation is usually prohibitive.
20 Rex v. Parke, [1903] 2 K.B. 432. It is not absolutely clear that such a legislative enactment would not run afoul of the first amendment. It appears, however, that the cases cited in
note 17 supra do not foreclose the possibility of a criminal contempt statute.
21 Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
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licity has so infected the public that no judicial safeguard' can be employed
to effectively afford the defendant a fair triaL25 This alternative is premised on
a recognition of the valuable right in a free press even in criminal matters. "If
the press has access to police headquarters and other sources of information
concerning police work, the probability that that work will be conducted with
respect for the rights of the accused and the public is increased immeasurably.""
Returning once again to the Sheppard case, unquestionably the editor of
the Cleveland Press went too far. But, are not such extreme actions sometimes
warranted in those cases where money and influence are often used to "hush
up" crimes and judicial malfeasance? Wouldn't it have also been a miscarriage
of justice if Sam Sheppard could have escaped indictment merely because he
was from one of the leading families?
Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the press must be taught responsibility. Perhaps good example and drying up of sources will be the answer. 5
Then again, maybe we cannot control the excesses of the press with anything
less than a legislative mandate, but before such drastic action is taken, an objective look at all the consequences must be made. This reviewer feels that the
emotional approach of the authors pales in the light of the rational and practical
urgings of J. Skelly Wright:
It is my belief that full recognition of the news media's rights under the
First Amendment would prevent a fair trial before an impartial jury as
required by the Sixth Amendment in only a precious few cases, and that
the dismissal of those few cases as non-triable would be a small price to
pay for the great benefits we all receive - the public generally and persons
accused of crime in particular - from the disclosures made in the press
with respect to the goings-on in police stations, district attorneys? offices,
and courthouses throughout the country.2"
Richard D. Catenacci*

22 Change of venue; change of venire; continuance; severance; voir dire examination;
challenges; sequestration; and instructions to the jury.
23 Address delivered at the annual meeting of the Bar Association of the Seventh Federal
Circuit, Chicago, Illinois, May 11, 1965, reported in 38 F.R.D. 435 (1966).
24 38 F.R.D. 435 (1966).
25 Edward Bennett Williams stated: "If lawyers would meticulously abide by this rule
[Canon 20], most of the difficulties would be overcome." WILLIAMS, ONE MAN'S FREEDOm 218.
26 38 F.R.D. 435 (1966).
* Member, New Jersey Bar.
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